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Characterization of Shareholder-Creditor Bad Debt:
United States v. Generes Sounds the Knell for
Deductions from Ordinary Income
I.

INTRODUCTION

The fluctuating financial needs of close corporations frequently
compel shareholders either to advance money to their corporations in
the form of loans or to provide adequate assurances to third-party
lenders in the form of personal guaranty or indemnity agreements. A
credit-based economy, moreover, exerts extraordinary pressure upon
controlling shareholders to satisfy the demands of disappointed corporate creditors in order to preserve or enhance the credit leverage of other
corporations in which the shareholders have controlling interests. One
result of these exigencies of current business practice has been that
considerations of the tax attributes available to shareholder losses are
becoming a principal determinant for structuring business transactions.
The tax relief available to an individual shareholder who, as lender
or guarantor, suffers personal economic impoverishment as a consequence of the insolvency of a corporate debtor is governed by sections
165 and 166 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Section 166 entitles
an individual to a bad debt deduction for economic losses resulting from
the partial or total worthlessness of a debt obligation. If the loss is
characterized as a business bad debt, the entire loss amount may be
offset against the taxpayer's ordinary income under section 166(a). Otherwise, the bad debt will receive short-term capital loss treatment under
section 166(d), which allows a maximum deduction from ordinary income of only 1,000 dollars.' Short-term capital loss treatment will also
follow a determination that the evidence of indebtedness is in fact a
security within the meaning of section 165(g)(2)(c). Other losses sustained by an investor entering into a transaction for profit, even though
that transaction is not part of a trade or business, may be fully offset
against ordinary income under section 165(c)(2).
The proper classification of shareholder losses on loans to, or on
behalf of, related corporations has been extensively litigated. Predictably, taxpayers have contended for full ordinary loss deductions while the
I. This limited availability of nonbusiness bad debt deductions from ordinary income is
provided only derivatively by § 166(d). Section 166(d) provides that "where any nonbusiness debt
becomes worthless within the taxable year, the loss resulting therefrom shall be considered a loss
from the sale or exchange, during the taxable year, of a capital asset held for not more than 6
months." Section 1211 (b), in turn, provides in susbstance that losses from the sale or exchange of
capital assets may never be applied against ordinary income in an amount greater than $1,000.
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Commissioner has insisted that short-term capital loss treatment is required. The courts have experienced considerable difficulty in characterizing losses on bad debts in the varied factual situations presented by
these cases.2 Nevertheless, certain basic doctrines have been developed
to dispose of the most common of the factual patterns from which bad
debt claims have arisen. In the course of this development, the courts
have centered their inquiry on the ambiguity inherent in the dual role
of a shareholder-creditor: was his advance to the corporation that of an
adventurer in the corporate business who hopes to be rewarded for his
risk by a share of the profits, or was it rather that of a lender who seeks
direct repayment from the capital of the corporation regardless of its
success?
The primary focus of this Note is on the development of the judicial
doctrines interpreting the provisions of section 166 as applied to shareholder losses on loans to related corporations. Whether, in any given
case, advances by shareholders will be considered loans or capital investments is beyond the scope of this work. For purposes of this study, the
existence of a valid debtor-creditor or debtor-guarantor relationship
between the corporation and its shareholder will be assumed. A brief
description of the statutory scheme of the bad debt and loss provisions
will be followed by a discussion of the origins and development of the
judicial doctrines interpreting the trade or business requirement in the
context of bad debt claims. The Note will then examine the problem of
current significance: under what circumstances will a loan be deemed
proximately related to the trade or business of the shareholder-creditor?
This examination will center on an analysis of the recent decision of the
Supreme Court in United States v. Generes3 and the implications of
that decision for future shareholder-creditors who suffer losses on loans
to their corporations.
II.
A.

STATUTORY SCHEME

Distinction Between Bad Debts and Other Losses

The progenitor of the present loss and bad debt provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code was Section II(B) of the Revenue Act of 1913.1
Section II(B) allowed the taxpayer to claim deductions for losses sus2. In the past 16 years the Supreme Court on 3 occasions has granted certiorari to resolve
conflicts in the circuits on the proper characterization of alleged bad debts. United States v.
Generes, 405 U.S. 93 (1972); Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193 (1963); Putnam v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 82 (1956).
3. 405 U.S. 93 (1972).
4. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167.
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tained in trade or resulting from fire, shipwreck, or storm, as well as
for "debts due to the taxpayer actually ascertained to be worthless and
charged off within the year."5 All bad debts and other losses were fully
deductible from ordinary income for both corporations and individuals.
The statutory treatment of bad debts differed from that accorded other
losses only in the extent to which the taxpayer could control the timing
of the deduction. Because losses were expressly made deductible in the
year sustained,' the timing of the deduction was usually determined by
a specific, identifiable occurrence in the regular business year of the
taxpayer. The statutory emphasis on the necessarily subjective "actual
ascertainment" of the worthlessness of a bad debt, however, effectively
allowed the taxpayer to claim this deduction whenever he pleased.
Although the taxpayer's ability to control the timing of bad debt
deductions is much diminished under the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, the structural distinction between bad debts and other losses has
been carried forward into sections 165 and 166. Taxpayers seeking to
maximize their chances for a deduction often plead these two provisions
in the alternative. In Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner,7 however, the Supreme Court declared the provisions mutually exclusive,
reasoning that the enactment of specific provisions covering bad debts
indicates that these economic losses are to be excepted from the operation of the general loss deduction provisions.
B.

Business v. Nonbusiness Bad Debt

The distinction between business and nonbusiness bad debts first
appeared in the Code in 1942.8 Motivated both by the increased revenue
needs of the World War II economy9 and by a desire to end abuses
resulting from full deductibility from ordinary income of worthless intrafamily "loans,"' 0 Congress in 1942 enacted the Ways and Means
5. Id. at 167.
6. 50 CONG. REC. 506, 3846-50, 4613 (1913).
7. 292 U.S. 182 (1934). For a critical analysis of the distinction see Note, Aspects of the
Bad Debt- Loss Dichotomy, 18 TAx L. REV. 121, 123 (1962). A taxpayer may still, however, claim
both a loss and a bad debt in the alternative. Larry E. Webb, 23 T.C. 1035 (1955); Lidgerwood
Mfg. Co., 22 T.C. 1152 (1954).
8. Revenue Act of 1942, § 124(a), 56 Stat. 820.
9. Hearings on H.R. 7378 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1942).
10. Congress felt that detection of fraudulent deductions under existing law for gifts disguised as loans had entailed prohibitive administrative expense. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. 44-45 (1942). The impressive number of pre-1942 cases in which the Treasury challenged
the good faith of alleged loans demonstrates that the congressional concern was justified. See, e.g.,
Ezra H. Jones, 13 B.T.A. 1271 (1928); Richard M. Page, 2 B.T.A. 1316 (1925).
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Committee's proposal that bad debts of a nonbusiness character be
accorded short-term capital loss treatment."

Initially, the courts interpreted the legislative history of this amendment as requiring only that suspect loan transactions between relatives
or friends be characterized as nonbusiness debts. 2 In Putnam v.
Commissioner,'y however, the Supreme Court greatly expanded the

operation of the nonbusiness bad debt provision in reliance upon a
perceived congressional intent to place nonbusiness investments in the

form of loans on an equal footing with other nonbusiness investments.
In Whipple v. Commissioner, the Court buttressed and expanded this
position, interpreting the nonbusiness bad debt provision as refusing full
deductibility to losses incurred by a taxpayer on loans not made in
connection with that limited class of activities which the tax law recognizes as a trade or business.

Section 166(d)(2) substantially reflects the Whipple Court's statement of the basis for distinguishing nonbusiness from business bad
debts. A nonbusiness debt is defined as any debt other than: "(A) a debt
created or acquired (as the case may be) in connection with a trade or
business of the taxpayer; or (B) a debt the loss from the worthlessness

of which is incurred in the taxpayer's trade or business."' 5 Under this
definition, every taxpayer must satisfy two criteria in order to qualify a
worthless obligation for the greater tax benefits accorded a business bad
debt: the taxpayer must have been engaged in a trade or business when
1I.Revenue Act of 1942, § 124(a)(4), 56 Stat. 821, provides: "Non-Business Debts-In the
case of a taxpayer, other than a corporation, if a non-business debt becomes worthless within the
taxable year, the loss resulting therefrom shall be considered a loss from the sale or exchange,
during the taxable year, of a capital asset held for not more than 6 months .... "
12. See, e.g., Robert Cluett, 3d, 8 T.C. 1178, 1179-80 (1947), acquiesced in, 1947-2 CuNI.
BULL. 2: "The legislative history of Section 23(k)(4) indicates that its principal purpose was to place
a limitation upon losses from bad debts, such as loans to relatives or friends which had no
connection with the business of the lender. . . .The debt here in question was not the result of a
loan by the petitioner to a friend or relative or an isolated transaction which bore no relation
whatsoever to the business in which he was engaged ...." (paragraphing omitted).
13. 352 U.S. 82 (1956). The taxpayer in Putnam had personally guaranteed a loan to a
corporation in which he was a stockholder. The corporation liquidated its assets and ceased doing
business. Putnam was obligated to repay the loan and sought to deduct it as a loss. The Court
held that taxpayer was limited to a nonbusiness bad debt deduction, emphasizing that friendly and
intrafamily loans were merely examples of the type of loan contemplated by the amendment.
14. 373 U.S. 193 (1963). "The 1942 amendment of § 23(k), therefore, as the Court has
already noted, Putnam v. Commissioner . . .was intended to accomplish far more than to deny
full deductibility to the worthless debts of family and friends. It was designed to make full deductibility of a bad debt turn upon its proximate connection with activities which the tax laws recognized
as a trade or business, a concept which falls short of reaching every income or profit making
activity." Id. at 201. See notes 29-36 infra and accompanying text.
15. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 166(d)(2)(A), (B).
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the loan was made; and he must have advanced the loan in connection
with that trade or business.
III.

TRADE OR BUSINESS REQUIREMENT

"The thorniest type of case before the courts involving the concept
16
of the nonbusiness bad debt has been that of the stockholder-creditor."'
Although the statutory prerequisite for a full ordinary income bad debt
deduction is that the loan have arisen in connection with activities that
the law recognizes as constituting a "trade or business," there is no
general definition of this phrase in either the Code or the Treasury
Regulations. In general, the courts have taken a restrictive view of the
scope of activities necessary to constitute a trade or business. The courts
have usually applied tests previously developed in interpretations of
other sections of the Code, 7 thereby arguably attributing to the term a
more restricted area of application in the bad debt context than the 1942
amendment fairly suggests.
One of the first cases to establish a working definition of the term
"trade or business" was Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.'8 In passing on the
deductibility of claimed business expenses, the Supreme Court in Flint
attributed a liberal meaning to "business," defining it to include
"everything about which a person can be employed."' 9
As the concept that deductions are a matter of legislative grace and
should therefore be strictly construed gained acceptance, however, the
Supreme Court's interpretations of "business" became increasingly restrictive. The suggestion that trade or business status requires holding
"one's self out to others as engaged in the selling of goods or services" 2
was substantially adopted by a majority of the Court in Higgins v.
Commissioner,2' which denied a business expense deduction to a taxpayer whose sole occupation was the management of his securities.
Investment activities alone were thus held insufficient to constitute a
"business.1 22 Prior decisions holding personal investment activities to be
16. Note, Bad Debts: Business or Non-Business?, 5 TAX L. REv. 412, 417 (1950).
17. In the determination of bad debt claims, the courts have applied cases interpreting the
term "trade or business" in regard to expenses, net operating loss carryover, and losses without
examination of their relevance. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Stokes' Estate, 200 F.2d 637 (3d Cir.
1953). See 5 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 28.31, at 126-34 (1969).
18. 220 U.S. 107 (1911).
19. Id. at 171.
20. Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488, 499 (1939) (concurring opinion).
21. 312 U.S. 212 (1941). The majority opinion concludes: "The petitioner merely kept
records and collected interest and dividends from his securities, through managerial attention for
his investments. No matter how large the estate or how continuous or extended the work required
may be, such facts are not sufficient as a matter of law ....
" Id. at 218.
22. The Higgins Court rejected Flint as based on corporate "excise" tax law. Id. at 217.
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trades or businesses were distinguished as founded in each case upon the
taxpayer's participation in the management of the corporation in which
he had invested-an implied recognition that investment-related activi23
ties may nevertheless constitute a business.
The courts have adhered strictly to the principle derived from
Higgins that losses of a shareholder-creditor do not qualify for a business bad debt deduction on a mere showing that the taxpayer engaged
in investing for profit. An early judicial tendency to presume that shareholder loans to related corporations were mere personal investments,24
however, gradually gave way to a recognition that some shareholders
may be entitled to business bad debt deductions. In granting a business
bad debt deduction to the taxpayer in Maytag v. United States, for
example, the Court of Claims followed the Higgins requirement of a
close examination of the business activities of a taxpayer who would use
this category.2" Higgins was factually distinguished, however: while the
taxpayer in Higgins was a mere passive investor who "had not formed
and did not control or work in ' 27 the corporations in which he invested,
taxpayer's lending activities in Maytag constituted a trade or business
because "he worked in [the debtor corporations], made the important
decisions in them, and put up the money to enable them to operate."28
The leading case on the "trade or business" requirement in the
shareholder-creditor bad debt context is the 1963 decision of the Supreme Court in Whipple v. Commissioner." The taxpayer in that case
owned the controlling interest in a company which he had actively developed from a sole proprietorship into a productive corporate enterprise
and to which he had made substantial cash advances. 31 When the corporation ultimately failed, the taxpayer deducted from his ordinary income the total face amount of the company's outstanding debt obliga23. In response to Higgins, Congress enacted what is now § 212 of the Code, which allows
expense deductions for nonbusiness income-producing activities. Hearings on H.R. 7378 Before
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 166 (1942).
24. See, e.g., Putnam v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 82, 92 (1956). ("There is no real or
economic difference between the loss of an investment . . . and one made indirectly in the form
of a guaranteed bank loan").
25. 289 F.2d 647 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
26. Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212, 217 (1941).
27. 289 F.2d at 650.
28. Id. at 649.
29. 373 U.S. 193 (1963).
30. Taxpayer owned 79% of the outstanding stock of a soft drink bottling company. He had
advanced substantial amounts of cash to the enterprise and had also purchased land and erected
buildings to house a bottling plant that he leased to the corporation. He had also established and
developed numerous other partnerships and corporations, all of which were actively engaged in
various business pursuits not directly related to the regular business of the bottling company.
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tions to him. The Supreme Court upheld the Commissioner's characterization of this economic loss as arising from a nonbusiness bad debt.3'
The Court's decision was founded upon a determination that lending and management activities do not constitute a trade or business
when those activities are directed toward increasing the return on, or the
value of, the taxpayer's investments.
Devoting one's time and energy to the affairs of a corporation is not of itself, and
without more, a trade or business of the person so engaged. Though such activities
may produce income, profit or gain in the form of dividends or enhancement in
the value of an investment, this return is distinctive to the process of investing and
is generated by the successful operation of the corporation's business as distinguished from the trade or business of the taxpayer himself. . . . [T]he return to
the taxpayer, though substantially the product of his services, legally arises not
from his own trade or business but from that of the corporation.3 2

The Court acknowledged that its decision placed upon the shareholdercreditor seeking a business bad debt deduction a heavy burden of providing "substantial evidence" to overcome the presumption that "furnishing management and other services to corporations for a reward not
different from that flowing to an investor in those corporations is not a
trade or business . . . . 33 The Court then increased this burden by
its summary dismissal of taxpayer's contention that his multicorporate
financing activities and management responsibilities 34 comprised a personal business independent of the business operations of any constituent
corporation: 5 "If full-time service to one corporation does not alone
31. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's deficiency assessment because it found that
Whipple was not in the business of organizing, promoting, financing, or managing corporations,
of money-lending generally, or of bottling soft drinks. 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 187 (1960). Specific
findings by the court denied trade or business status to Whipple's lending activity to fellow shareholders, partners, corporations, and partnerships. Id. at 191. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. 301 F.2d
108 (5th Cir. 1962). In the Supreme Court, the taxpayer maintained that the loans had been made
in connection with one or more of the following businesses: organizing, financing, and managing
corporations, partnerships, and joint ventures; financing corporations and lending money; acquiring, owning, expanding, equipping and leasing bottling plants and other equipment; conducting
activities in connection with the bottling and sale of soft drinks. Brief for Petitioner at 13, Whipple
v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193 (1963); see Lewis, Deductibility of Losses Arisingfrom Business
Ventures, 18 MAJOR TAx PLANNING 625, 634 (1966). The Court remanded the case to the Tax

Court for consideration of evidence on the third contention, but sustained the lower court's findings
on the others.
32. 373 U.S. at 202.
33. Id. at 203.
34. Whipple had produced evidence showing continuous and concerted business activities
over a 14-year period. During the 2-year period in issue, he realized $94,478.71 ordinary income
from salaries, interest, and rent, and $56,378.28 ordinary income from partnerships and joint
ventures. Dividend income for the specified period amounted to only $3,300. Brief for Petitioner
at 7-8, Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193 (1963).
35. 373 U.S. at 201-02. Whipple emphasized the required nature of his managerial and
money-lending activities and the regularity of transactions resulting in ordinary income in his
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amount to a trade or business, which it does not, it is difficult to understand how the same service to many corporations would suffice." 3
The underlying rationale of Whipple is essentially that of Higgins:
activities which, if successful, will generate capital gains ought not,
without express Congressional approval, give rise to ordinary loss if
unsuccessful. Like Higgins, Whipple articulated this rationale in broad,
almost philosophical terms, providing later courts with only vaguely
defined criteria for determining the narrowed scope of activities that will
support a full ordinary income deduction. Consequently, previously established judicial characterizations of specific shareholder-creditor activities as giving rise to business bad debts have been continually, and
sometimes inconsistently, modified in the decade following Whipple.
There remain, however, three generalized exceptions to the Whipple
presumption of non-business status for shareholder-creditor transactions: loans by promoters; loans by taxpayers in the money-lending
business; and loans made to a corporation in order to maintain or
further the taxpayer's separate trade or business. Loans in the latter
class of cases fall into two groups: loans to preserve an employment
relationship; and loans to maintain or support the activities of a separate
noncorporate enterprise.
A.

The Promoter Doctrine

Since the early 1930's, courts have on occasion found a
shareholder-creditor to be engaged in the trade or business of a "promoter, ' ' 37 but only in "the exceptional situations where the taxpayer's
attempt to demonstrate that he was neither passively investing nor merely engaging in transactions
for profit. "[In order to organize, arrange for and keep in touch with the financing of, coordinate
the various activities of, and make the general policy decisions for a group of enterprises, as in the
Whipple case varying from a retail lumber yard, to a restaurant, to various phases of a soft drinks
enterprise. . . rental properties, promotion of oil deals, subdivision of real estate. . . construction
of houses in different locations, managing an equipment rental corporation and other activities,
would necessarily take such extensive time, thought and efforts of the taxpayer, completely separate from the actual business operations of each of the enterprises themselves, as to constitute a
business in itself, which does not exist in the case of the single corporation. This is the basis of the
decisions of the cases of multiple corporations." Reply Brief for Petitioner at 21-22, Whipple v.
Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193 (1936).
36. 373 U.S. at 202.
37. In Washburn v. Commissioner, 51 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1931), taxpayer owned and managed a number of corporations. He claimed that a loss incurred on the sale of stock of one of several
corporations under his control and management was eligible for net operating loss carry forward
because it resulted from the regular operation of a business carried on in accordance with § 214
of the Revenue Act of 1921. The court held that the exclusive devotion of one's time to the
management of corporate ventures could constitute a trade or business separate and distinct from
the activities of any of the particular managed corporations, stating that "[the taxpayer's] income
was the result, not alone of his investments, but also of his labor expended in connection with the
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activities in promoting, financing, managing, and making loans to a
number of corporations have been regarded as so extensive as to constitute a business separate and distinct from the business carried on by the
corporations themselves." 38 Prior to Whipple, most determinations of
promoter status appear to have turned on the multicorporate extent of
the taxpayer's activities. Some courts, however, eschewed the superficial
inquiry "whether the occupation of the party involved so consists of
time, money, and effort as to constitute his business life," 39 and instead
based their decisions on the character of the taxpayer's activities.
These incompatible approaches led to conflicting decisions on business bad debt claims founded on alleged promoter status. In Vincent C.
Campbell," taxpayers, who for sixteen years had owned and operated
twelve related corporations, sought business bad debt deductions for
losses sustained on loans to one of their enterprises. The Tax Court
allowed the deductions on the theory that the losses resulted from the
business of owning and operating corporations. In Commissioner v.
Smith,4' however, the Second Circuit denied a similar claim for business
bad debt treatment on the authority of Burnet v. Clark,42 which had held
that business conducted in the taxpayer's capacity as a corporate officer
did not constitute a separate, independent trade or business. The Smith
court stated:
Respondent's activities in the case at bar were essentially similar to those of the
taxpayer in the Clark case, except that respondent here was interested as an investor, manager, and creditor in a number of business enterprises. But since each of
these activities separately does not constitute a business, we cannot see how a
combination of them spread over various businesses can alter the result."4

In Whipple, the Supreme Court wholly redefined the promoter
doctrine. In language quite similar to that of the Smith decision,44 the
Whipple opinion clearly rejected prior cases holding that a mere showing of multicorporate organization and management would suffice to
establish an independent business of the taxpayer.45 The Court not only
management ....

The combination of the two is his vocation." Id. at 954. See also Foss v.

Commissioner, 75 F.2d 326 (Ist Cir. 1935) (sustaining taxpayer's deduction of attorney's fees as a
business expense under § 214(a) of the Revenue Act of 1918).
38. Charles G. Berwind, 20 T.C. 808, 815 (1953), affd per curiam, 211 F.2d 575 (3d Cir.
1954). Financing, organizing, and operating a single business enterprise will not qualify a
shareholder-creditor for promoter status. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 240 (10th
Cir. 1954). William Bernstein, II CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 118 (1952).
39. A. Kingsley Ferguson, 16 T.C. 1248, 1257 (1951).
40. II T.C. 510 (1948).
41. 203 F.2d 310 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
42. 287 U.S. 410 (1932).
43. 203 F.2d at 312.
44. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
45. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
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narrowed the class of promotional activities that may constitute a trade
or business; it effectively bifurcated the remainder into categories of
''pure promoter" and "dealer in enterprises" business activities.
The "pure promoter" is one who, for a fee or commission, organizes a corporation and supplies its operating capital. To qualify for
business bad debt treatment, however, a pure promoter's loan need not
be made in the initial capitalization of the corporation if it is a reasonably necessary incident of other promotional activities. In Ralph
Biernbaum," for example, taxpayer had advanced cash to a controlled
department store corporation so that it could maintain a program of
business expansion. The corporation used the funds to finance leases for
lots in shopping centers that taxpayer promoted, thereby enhancing
taxpayer's bargaining position with other prospective tenants. The Tax
Court allowed the deduction, holding that the loans were a direct incident of taxpayer's separate and distinct promoting business.
47
The "dealer in enterprises" concept acknowledged by Whipple
had been formulated previously in Giblin v. Commissioner." Like the
pure promoter, the dealer in enterprises organizes, finances, and promotes corporations, but he does so with the sole objective of selling the
developed corporations at a profit. In passing upon taxpayer claims of
"dealer in enterprises" status, courts have rigorously applied Whipple's
substantial evidence standard to forestall unwarranted business bad debt
deductions. In Townshend v. United States,49 for example, taxpayer's
claim that he had developed several small businesses with the primary
intent of subsequently selling the enterprises at a profit was defeated by
a finding that taxpayer had neither sold a corporation in which he had
an interest nor made any effort to sell one. Taxpayer's evidence that he
had influenced the corporations to sell some of their assets in the form
of product lines was adjudged insufficient proof of a separate trade or
business.
In pointing to this transaction as a typical instance of his engagement in the
business of selling product lines, plaintiff betrays a common lay misconception, i.e.,
that of the major stockholder in a closely held corporation confusing the corporate
business with his own. It was not plaintiff who sold the power tool line . . . . [I]f
anyone can be said to be engaged in the business of selling product lines, it was
the corporation which was so engaged, not plaintiff. And the business of a corporation is not the business of its stockholders or officers. 50
46. 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1188 (1963).
47.

373 U.S. at 202-03.

48. 227 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1955) (during the course of 20 years, taxpayer provided money
and much of his time to the organization and sale of numerous business enterprises).
49.

384 F.2d 1008 (Ct. C1. 1967).

50. Id. at 1013. See also United States v. Byck, 325 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1963).
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Although the emphasis of the Whipple decision was on the character of the financial return ultimately to be derived by the taxpayer,
subsequent courts have tended to focus on the taxpayer's activities
themselves in defining the parameters of "pure promoter" and "dealer
in enterprises" status. Nevertheless, the courts have not lost sight of
Whipple's underlying rationale. As stated by the court in Townshend:
If [the taxpayer] promotes corporate enterprises for fees and commissions or with
a view to an early and profitable sale thereof after the business has become established, then the expected income would be "received directly for his own services
rather than indirectly through the corporate enterprise," and he may properly be
said to have a business of his own separate and apart from the businesses of the
corporations."

Thus a finding of prolonged taxpayer investment or of withdrawal from
promotional activities for personal or family reasons, for example, will
vitiate a contention that the taxpayer is engaged in separate business
activities and will provide potent evidence from which to infer the pre2
dominance of affirmative investment interests.1
B.

The Money-Lending Business Doctrine

The courts have readily accepted the proposition that a taxpayer
who is actively and regularly engaged in the business of lending money
is entitled to a business bad debt deduction for worthless loans made in
the course of this business. Taxpayers seeking to justify full ordinary
income deductions for losses on loans to related corporations by resort
to the money-lending business doctrine, however, have met with only
slight success. 53 Few taxpayers other than full-time finance-business
operators make loans in sufficient amounts to qualify their moneylending activities as a trade or business. A taxpayer who demonstrates
sufficient lending activity, moreover, may still be denied a full ordinary
deduction for a loan to a closely held corporation in which he has an
interest if, as is frequently the case, the loan was made on terms lenient
enough to indicate that the loan was not made in the course of the
51. 384 F.2d at 1012.
52. Syer v. United States, 380 F.2d 1009, 1010 (4th Cir. 1967). For a general discussion of
the promoter doctrine see Brink, How Business Promoters Can Meet the Trade or Business Test

for Bad Debts, 23 J. TAXATION 170 (1965).
53. See, e.g., Max Barish, 31 T.C. 1280 (1959). Taxpayer in Barish had made 9 loans,
totaling $29,860.32, to 4 borrowers. Taxpayer owned 50% of the stock of a new car dealership,
which constituted his principal business activity, and had numerous other business interests that
he had promoted and organized. The worthless debt obligations were held against his new car
dealership. The Tax Court determined that taxpayer had demonstrated insufficient lending activity
to constitute a trade or business.
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lending business.Because it is usually urged in the alternative to "promoter" or
"furtherance of separate business" claims, the money-lending business
doctrine rarely has been given a thorough analysis; even cases that find
a valid money-lending business offer little guidance beyond the general
observation that "the question of whether the [lending] activities of a
taxpayer constitute the carrying on of a trade or business is largely one
of fact . . . ."I Moreover, the vast majority of bad debt claims arising
from a taxpayer's alleged separate lending business presumably have
not been challenged by the Commissioner. It is thus difficult to determine what general criteria the courts will deem relevant in deciding
whether the lending activity of a taxpayer is significant enough to constitute a separate trade or business.
An exception to the pattern of superficial treatment that courts
have given the money-lending business doctrine is the opinion in
Williams v. United States,5 in which a district court upheld taxpayer's
claim that his personal guarantees of the notes of a citrus machinery
corporation in which he held stock, as well as his direct loans to the
corporation, were made in the course of his separate business of lending
money. The court declared that a taxpayer must show continuous and
repeated lending activity together with a reasonable expectation of
profit in order to succeed in his money-lending business claim. The court
then enumerated the criteria by which it would determine whether the
activities of a taxpayer meet the required business standard. These criteria included: (1) the frequency with which the taxpayer actually made
loans with the expectation of profit; (2) his primary source of income
during the years involved; (3) the profession that he would deem his
own; (4) the effort and care devoted by him to money-lending activities;
(5) the number of times that he engaged in such activity; (6) whether he
considered and treated his lending transactions as closer to an investment activity than an active business."
The Williams court's effort to articulate the factors that indicate
separate business activity is commendable, but it is of limited assistance
to the taxpayer planning lending activity or to the attorney preparing
54. See, e.g., United States v. Henderson, 375 F.2d 36 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 844
(1967).
55. Yeager v. United States, I Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 523, 528 (W.D. Ky. 1958). Decedent had
personally interviewed potential borrowers almost daily, and kept detailed records of the loans he
made. He took mortgages and notes as security and was diligent in enforcing collection. "The
extent of his activity . . . warrants the conclusion that he was more than a passive investor." Id.
56. 12 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6157 (M.D. Fla. 1963).
57. Id. at 6160.

1973]

BUSINESS BAD DEBT DEDUCTION

to litigate his claim. The thrust of the court's analysis, as revealed by
the third and sixth of the listed criteria, is to determine the state of mind
with which the taxpayer engaged in lending activity. Although this approach appears consistent with the Supreme Court's unstated emphasis
on the taxpayer's subjective investment intent in the Higgins and
Whipple cases, the Williams state-of-mind standard is unsuitable for
purposes of both judicial administration and business planning. Although the first five of the Williams criteria are-with the possible
exception of the third-satisfactorily objective, they are of value only
as factors from which inferences may be drawn in determining the
ultimate question of the taxpayer's subjective expectations. Business bad
debt litigation may thus be expected to turn largely upon the sixth
criterion, which will place undue emphasis on the taxpayer's self-serving
statements before the court. The absence of a clearly established objective standard will thus continue to breed considerable uncertainty and
to cause business bad debt claims based on regular lending activity to
be determined on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, some limits on the
money-lending business doctrine are clear. It seems certain, for example, that lending money solely to one's own corporations will not support a finding of a separate money-lending business. Further, loans to
corporations in which one has a substantial investment or family interest
are patently suspect and will seldom be useful for purposes of showing
regular money-lending activity.58 Finally, informal personal lending activity has always been viewed with suspicion; unless the taxpayer forms
and operates a business enterprise exclusively for lending activity, it is
unlikely that he will be able to establish his financing activities as a trade
or business.
C. Shareholder'sSeparate Trade or Business Related to Corporation
A shareholder who is engaged in a separate trade or business related to that of his corporation may obtain a business bad debt deduction for uncollectible loans to the corporation made in connection with
his individual business. The taxpayer's separate trade or business may
be either that of being an officer or other employee of the debtor corporation or of operating a sole proprietorship which is either a customer
or supplier of the debtor corporation. Of the three exceptions to the
Whipple presumption of nonbusiness status, claims based upon a related
individual trade or business have met with the highest degree of success
in recent years. 9
58.
59.

Gross v. Commissioner, 401 F.2d 600 (9th Cir. 1968).
Because these cases have frequently turned upon a showing of proximate relationship
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1. Preserving the Employment Relationship.-Bad debts arising
from loans to a corporation made by an employee in order to retain his
employment may qualify for business bad debt treatment. This judicial
doctrine of relatively recent origin is predicated on the idea that an
employee may be engaged in a "trade or business of rendering services
for pay "60 and may thus be motivated to lend money to his corporation
by considerations other than expected investment return.
That a taxpayer's service as an officer of a corporation in which
he is a stockholder or creditor would not constitute a separate individual
trade or business was generally assumed prior to 1961.61 In Trent v.
2
Commissioner,1
however, the Second Circuit rejected this narrow view
of the trade or business requirement. In Trent, taxpayer had been required to purchase one-third of the employing corporation's stock as a
condition of his employment and had been instructed that it would be
necessary for him to make loans to the corporation from time to time
until the corporation's financial condition improved. Taxpayer dutifully
lent the corporation 9,000 dollars during the first year of his employment. Because he refused to continue making loans, however, he was
ultimately discharged. When the corporation defaulted on the loans,
taxpayer sought a business bad debt deduction. The Second Circuit
unanimously reversed the Tax Court's disallowance of the deduction,
stating that the lower court's holding was founded upon the erroneous
belief "that, as a matter of law, loans made to a corporation by an
employee for the purpose of protecting his employment cannot be" a
business debt.63 The Trent opinion stated in dictum that only if taxpayer had not devoted a major part of his working time to serving the
debtor corporation64 or had not been compensated for his services"3
would his claim that he was engaged in a full-time business for pay be
denied.66
between the individual business and the worthless debt, however, this exception will presumably
be the one most severely affected by the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Generes,
405 U.S. 93 (1972). See text accompanying notes 106-28 infra.
60. Folker v. Johnson, 230 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1956).
61. See, e.g., Skarda v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1957).
62. 291 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1961).
63. 291 F.2d at 670.
64. See, e.g., Hickerson v. Commissioner, 229 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1956) (taxpayer owned and
operated another business).
65. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Shaefer, 240 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1957) (taxpayer served as
corporate president without pay). In the Whipple case, the Court made no determination of the
weight to be accorded compensation for services to a debtor corporation, since taxpayer had
received no compensation from the debtor corporation.
66. The decision tacitly recognized that active participation in the activities of a corporation
might constitute a trade or business of the shareholder. Contra,United States v. Worrell, 398 F.2d
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Trent's sweeping approval of business bad debt status for worthless
corporate obligations in the hands of shareholder-employees was soon
narrowed by the Second Circuit in Weddle v. Commissioner.7 Although
it quoted Trent with approval, the Weddlc court affirmed a Tax Court
decision denying business bad debt treatment to the loss stemming from
repayment of a guaranteed corporate loan by a majority stockholder
who was employed by her corporation as president and general manager. The Tax Court had accepted taxpayer's contention that she was
engaged in the separate trade or business of being an employee of her
corporation, but nevertheless sustained the Commissioner's deficiency
assessment on the ground that her "endorsement of the company's notes
was not proximately related to such trade or business"68 as opposed to
her status as an investor in the corporation. 9 The Second Circuit affirmed, on the single ground that taxpayer had failed to show that
protection of her trade or business of employment had been a significant
70
motivation for guaranteeing the obligations.
The stigma thus attached to a controlling shareholder is apparent
in many later cases. In Kelley v. Patterson,7' the Fifth Circuit held that
loans by a salaried sole shareholder to his employer corporation were
made only to protect the shareholder's investment. Applying the "significant motivation" test advanced in Weddle, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that preservation of a controlling shareholder's employment by his corporation is but an incident of the protection of his investment interest
and is thus inadequate to support a claim of independent business motivation for a loan to his enterprise. In Niblock v. Commissioner,72 the
Seventh Circuit similarly denied business bad debt treatment to losses
sustained by the taxpayer on his satisfaction of personal guaranties of
his corporation's debt obligations to a bank. In rejecting taxpayer's
427 (5th Cir. 1968) (mere voluntary service as personal indemnitor of a corporation's surety
creditor is not job protection and business bad debt deduction is therefore unavailable).
67. 325 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1963), affg 39 T.C. 493 (1962).
68. 39 T.C. 493, 495 (1962).
69. Id. at 496. Taxpayer's testimony revealed that she had presumed that her position as
"owner" of the business compelled her to assume the responsibility of guaranteeing loans obtained
for carrying on the activities of the business enterprise. Id. at 497. The court declared this belief
insufficient to establish the required proximate relationship of the guaranty to the preservation of
her separate business as a corporate employee.
70. Rejecting the lower court's reference to a primary motivation standard for determining
the sufficiency of the proximate relationship, the majority opinion stated: "[i]t
suffices for deduction that the creation of the debt should have been significantly motivated by the taxpayer's trade
or business, even though there was a non-qualifying motivation as well." 325 F.2d at 851 (emphasis
added).
71. 331 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1964).
72. 417 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1969).
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contention that the guaranties were necessarily related to the preservation of his employee trade or business, the court relied on a factual
determination that the taxpayer certainly would be able to obtain equivalent employment elsewhere.
Although controlling shareholders who seek to justify business bad
debt deductions on "preservation of the employment relationship"
grounds have been generally unsuccessful, the Tax Court has shown a
willingness to grant deductions to controlling shareholders who are unable to find or to accept employment elsewhere. In Isidor Jaffe,7 3 taxpayer's claim that he had made loans and personal guaranties to insure
the liquidity of his closely held corporation and thereby to preserve his
employment relationship was upheld on the grounds that taxpayer's
age-70 years-made him virtually unemployable in the open market.
A similar rationale supported the decision in Estate of Kent A very,74 in
which the Tax Court relied on the following unusual facts:
Here. .. the $50,000 advance was not made merely to protect an existing job, but
was made in order to create the very job that [taxpayer] sought for himself. His
personality difficulties in working under others or with others of equal status were
amply described by his psychiatrist. . . . His trade or business was that of a stylist
and the corporation was organized to enable him to carry on that trade or business. . . . [T]his loan was primarily related to his trade or business as a stylist and
only secondarily may it be considered a mere investment in the corporation.15

In a recent Revenue Ruling,76 the Commissioner has accepted the
judicial doctrine that a taxpayer's job may constitute a trade or business, and that losses on loans made to protect that job may therefore
qualify as business bad debts. The recurrent problem in shareholdercreditor claims relying on this theory, however, will continue to be the
proof of a proximate relationship between loans or guaranties and employment preservation. Apart from a few recent cases finding an insufficient causal relationship between the loans and employment protection,7 7 the major obstacle faced by shareholder-employees has been
proving that loans to their corporations were not in fact motivated by
investment considerations. For the controlling shareholder this obstacle
has been virtually insurmountable, 78 especially when his salary has been
modest in comparison with his investment return. 79 Indeed, the
shareholder-employee cases indicate that, in the absence of unusual
73.

26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1063 (1967).

74.

28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 364 (1969).

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 370-71.
Rev. Rul. 71-561, 1971 INT. REv. BULL. No. 50, at 13.
See, e.g., Stratmore v. United States, 420 F.2d 461 (3d Cir. 1970).
Cf. Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193, 204 (1963) (dictum).
Millsap v. Commissioner, 387 F.2d 420 (8th Cir. 1968).
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factual circumstances, it is essential that a taxpayer hold less than a
controlling interest in the employing corporation if he is to establish the
necessary proximate relation of loan to employment protection. Moreover, the smaller the taxpayer's interest in the corporation, the more
probable it is that he will overcome the imputation of disqualifying
investment motivation. 0
2. Separate Noncorporate Business Enterprise.-The rationale
upholding "business" treatment for loans to related corporations made
in order to support a separate enterprise in which the taxpayer has a
business interest is essentially identical to that underlying the employment preservation doctrine. Just as loans to a corporate employer may
be required to protect one's employee status, lending to a corporate
supplier or major customer of one's separate enterprise may be necessary to preserve one's separate business interests. To bring his transactions within this rationale, the taxpayer must show that the trade or
business is separate and distinct from that of the debtor corporation 8'
and is one in which the taxpayer actively participates as a sole proprietor
82
or partner.
The two leading cases interpreting the separate business enterprise
doctrine were decided under section 23(k)(4) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939, the immediate predecessor of present section 166. In J. T.
Dorminey,8 taxpayer had made loans to a banana import corporation
of which he was vice president and a major stockholder. Taxpayer had
formed the corporation to assure a constant supply of bananas for a
wholesale produce dealership of which he was the sole proprietor. Finding that the loans were incidental and proximately related to the needs
of taxpayer's produce business, the Tax Court held that the loss resulting from the corporation's default was fully deductible as a business bad
debt. A different conclusion was reached by the Fourth Circuit in
84 Taxpayer in that case was a peanut farmer
Gulledge v. Commissioner.
who had advanced funds to a peanut processing corporation that he and
other peanut farmers had formed to assure a better market for their
produce. The corporation purchased not only taxpayer's peanut crop
but also the crops of all farmers in the area. Although the court found
the farming and processing businesses to be separate and distinct, it
80. Philip W. Fitzpatrick, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1 (1967).
81. See Burnet v. Clark, 287 U.S. 410 (1932); Dalton v. Bowers, 287 U.S. 404 (1932).
82. See, e.g., S. E. Maitland Brenhouse, 37 T.C. 326 (1961), acquiesced in, 1962-2 CuNI.
BULL. 4.
83. 26 T.C. 940 (1956).
84. 249 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 959 (1958); cf. Spillers v. Commissioner, 407 F.2d 530, 534-35 (5th Cir. 1969).
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found that taxpayer's loans had been made with the objective, not of
supporting his farming operations, but rather of generating investment
returns through dividends and an enhancement in the processing corporation's capital value.
The Tax Court generally has given the independent business doctrine a liberal application. Thus, when taxpayer's building contractor
partnership executed a guaranty, customary in the trade, in connection
with the financing arrangements of taxpayer's partially owned housing
development corporation, the court held that taxpayer's payment upon
the corporation's default was properly deductible under section 166 or
section 162(a).85 Similarly, when a professional has been able to establish a direct relationship between a loan to a client corporation and the
preservation or enhancement of his professional income, the court has
sustained a business bad debt deduction for resultant losses.86 Defaulted
loans to corporations that are not yet clients, however, are subjected to
close scrutiny when claimed as business bad debts,87 especially when the
professional is a majority shareholder of the borrowing corporation. 88
The decision of the Ninth Circuit in Lundgren v. Commissioner9
contains an important application of the separate business enterprise
and preservation of employment doctrines. In Lundgren, taxpayer had
organized and actively managed several interrelated timber and lumber
businesses. One of these enterprises, a lumber marketing corporation of
which taxpayer was both an officer and the majority stockholder, had
been organized to purchase timber that taxpayer acquired in an individual capacity. The marketing corporation had been unable to obtain
loans from banks and had sought a loan from the United States Small
Business Administration (SBA). The SBA agreed to advance funds to
the corporation upon condition that taxpayer, among other things, act
as guarantor, advance an additional 145,000 dollars of his own money,
and make timber available to the corporation at cost until the obligation
was satisfied. Taxpayer complied with this request, and when the corporation's facilities were ultimately destroyed by fire, he sustained a loss
of 129,000 dollars on his advance.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's disallowance of taxpayer's business bad debt deduction and held that he had satisfied the
requirements of section 166 on both employment protection and sepa85. A. L. Stanchfield, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1681 (1965).
86. Frank A. Garlove, 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1147 (1965).
87. Robert B. Milgroom, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 533 (1962).
88. Estate of Dominick F. Pachella, 37 T.C. 347 (1961), affdper curiam, 310 F.2d 815 (3d
Cir. 1962).
89. 376 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1967).
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rate business enterprise grounds. The conditions imposed by the SBA
financing agreement were central to each holding. Although taxpayer
had never profited from his sales of timber to the corporation, the court
reasoned that the SBA requirement that taxpayer sell to the corporation
at cost justified his separate business enterprise claim, which was based
upon anticipated sales to the corporation at a profit upon retirement of
the debt. The court also rejected the lower court's finding that taxpayer
was not in the business of providing services to the corporation because
he never received a salary. The court held that, because the SBA prohibited payment of any salary to officers of the corporation without SBA
permission, and because taxpayer fully anticipated receipt of salary as
soon as the restrictions were withdrawn, the postponed realization of
economic gain would not vitiate taxpayer's claim that his rendition of
services to the corporation constituted a trade or business. The court
reasoned:
Rushmore's [the corporation's] existence depended upon its ability to obtain the
financing necessary to put its . . . operations under way. If the SBA loan had not
gone through, the corporation-and petitioner's job with it-would have been finished. In a direct sense, therefore, the advances were related to petitioner's trade
or business activities in connection with Rushmore.' 0

The Lundgren holding was the product of somewhat unusual factual circumstances. Nevertheless, the decision introduces significant
flexibility into the trade or business requirement. Although proof of a
separate trade or business based upon anticipated salary income or
projected independent business profits on transactions with a related
corporation may pose a difficult evidentiary problem, Lundgren clearly
shows that reasonable expectations of this nature are not insufficient as
a matter of law to support business bad debt claims.
IV.

PROXIMATE RELATIONSHIP REQUIREMENT

A successful showing that the activities of a shareholder-creditor
constitute a trade or business separate from that of the corporate debtor
is alone not enough to qualify a worthless obligation for full deductibility from ordinary income. Section 166(d)(2)(A), defining business bad
debts as debts acquired "in connection with a trade or business of the
taxpayer,"'" requires a further showing that the loan in issue was related
to taxpayer's trade or business rather than to other profit-seeking activity. Treasury Regulation section 1.166-5(b) explains this definition as
limiting business bad debt status to those debts that are proximately
90. Id. at 628 (citations omitted).
91.

INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 166(d)(2)(A).
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related to the taxpayer's separate trade or business. 2 Neither the Code
nor the Regulations, however, provide a general definition of "proximate," the crucial term in Regulation section 1.166-5(b). 3 This definitional void became the focus of much of the bad debt litigation of the
last decade.
A.

Development of Conflicting JudicialStandards

The judicial development of criteria for determining the existence
of a proximate relationship between bad debt losses and a shareholdercreditor's separate trade or business may be traced to a joint origin in
Trent v. Commissioner94 and Whipple v. Commissioner.5 Trent held
that a proximate relationship was established when advances to a related corporation were shown to be a necessary condition of taxpayer's
continuation of his separate trade or business. 6 In Whipple, the Supreme Court apparently accepted the Trent situation as the exemplar
of a proximate relationship, and indicated approval of the proximate
relation test itself, by rejecting taxpayer's employment protection claim
on the grounds that "no proof [had been offered] . . . that the loan was
necessary to keep his job or was otherwise proximately related to maintaining his trade or business as an employee." 97 By its central emphasis
on the distinction between bad debts arising from business activities and
those arising from activities peculiar to investors, moreover, Whipple
added to the proximate relation parameters a consideration of the relative weights attributable to a shareholder-creditor's underlying investment and separate business interests.
92. Treas. Reg. § 1.166-5(b) (1959) provides: "(b) Nonbusiness debt defined. For purposes
of section 166 and this section, a nonbusiness debt is any debt other than- . . . (2) A debt the
loss from the worthlessness of which is incurred in the taxpayer's trade or business. The question
whether a debt is a nonbusiness debt is a question of fact in each particular case. . . .For purpose
of subparagraph (2) of this paragraph, the character of the debt is to be determined by the relation
which the loss resulting from the debt's becoming worthless bears to the trade or business of the
taxpayer. If that relation is a proximate one in the conduct of the trade or business in which the
taxpayer is engaged at the time the debt becomes worthless, the debt comes within the exception
provided by that subparagraph." For a general discussion of the problems posed by the Regulation
see Comment, Bad Debt Deduction for Shareholder-Creditor Under Proximate Relation Test, 28
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 161 (1971).
93. Although the term occurs several times in the Report of the Committee on Ways and
Means on the Revenue Act of 1942, HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, THE REVENUE BILL
oF 1942, H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 74-76 (1942), no specific meaning is ascribed
to it therein.
94. 291 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1961).
95. 373 U.S. 193 (1963).
96. Cf J.T. Dorminey, 26 T.C. 940 (1956); Tony Martin, 25 T.C. 94 (1955).
97. 373 U.S. at 204 (1963).
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A synthesis of these various elements was attempted by the Second
Circuit in Weddle v. Commissioner.98 The court first applied the "necessary condition" test of Trent, and found that loan obligations of a
related corporation in the hands of a majority shareholder-officer could
be proximately related to the preservation of employment on the ground
that the failure of the corporation for lack of funds would effectively
result in employee discharge. The court then interpreted Whipple as
requiring some minimum amount of separate business motivation for
the loan in order to qualify it for business bad debt status. Existence of
the necessary degree of noninvestment motivation was found to turn on
the meaning of "proximate." The majority concluded that a showing of
a significant business motive would be sufficient to offset such considerations as a desire to enhance the value of capital stock or to increase
dividend returns. Writing for the majority, Judge Friendly buttressed
this position with two arguments: the majority's interpretation was
wholly consistent with the legislative history of the Revenue Act of 1942;
and, more importantly, the purposeful selection of the word "proximate" indicated an acceptance of the meaning of that word in its area
of greatest use-the law of torts. Judge Friendly reasoned: "[A] cause
contributing to a harm may be found 'proximate' despite the fact that
it may have been 'secondary' to another contributing cause. [Thus] it
suffices for deduction that the creation of the debt should have been
significantly motivated by the taxpayer's trade or business, even though
there was a non-qualifying motivation as well." 99 Finding that taxpayer
had failed to prove even a significant business motivation for the loan
in question, however, the majority disallowed the business bad debt
deduction.
Judge Lumbard concurred in the result in Weddle, but he insisted
that "proximately related" to a creditor's business should be held to
mean "primarily" related thereto. Judge Lumbard emphasized the patent incongruity of considerations peculiarly relevant to tort law-time,
space, foreseeability, and the basic notion of causation in fact-to a tax
problem requiring the isolation and evaluation of the various motivations that may simultaneously trigger a given loan or guaranty. The
significant motivation standard, he predicted, would invariably result in
judgment for the taxpayer; more importantly, that standard would not
easily be understood or applied. 00°
Although most courts continued to avoid setting out a specific
98. 325 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1963).
99. Id. at 851.
100. Id.
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standard of "proximate relationship,"''1 1 each of the competing interpretations in Weddle attracted adherents. The "significant motivation"
standard was adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Kelley v. Patterson' and
by the Eighth Circuit in Millsap v. Commissioner. 3 Several courts,
however, viewed the liberal interpretation of the Weddle majority as
inconsistent with Whipple and as contrary to the congressional policy
of encouraging active business endeavours by making available tax benefits not accorded mere passive investments. In Niblock v.
Commissioner,0' the Seventh Circuit challenged the relevance of tort
concepts to the federal income tax law because of the very different
social policy considerations underlying each body of law. Niblock
adopted a "dominant and primary" motivation standard as the only test
that would assure consistency in the application of section 166. No
court, however, departed from the Weddle pattern to suggest a possible
third test of proximate relationship, and the issue was thus fixed as a
conflict between the two motivational standards. In United States v.
Generes,0 5 the Supreme Court resolved this conflict.
B.

United States v. Generes

The taxpayer in Generes was president of a family construction
corporation in which he and a son-in-law each owned 44 percent of the
capital stock.0 6 Although taxpayer was paid an annual salary of 12,000
dollars, he received neither dividends nor any other return on his original investment during the entire history of the enterprise. In addition
to formulating cost estimates and feasibility projections and receiving
job bids for the corporation, taxpayer had helped obtain necessary financing by arranging loans and providing personal guarantees. When
the construction company went into receivership, taxpayer was forced
to satisfy a personal indemnity obligation arising from his agreement
to reimburse a bonding company in the event of the construction company's default on payment and performance bonds. Taxpayer deducted
this payment from his current ordinary income pro tanto, and applied
the remainder as a net operating loss carry back under section 172.17
101. See, e.g., Stratmore v. United States, 420 F.2d 461 (3d Cir. 1970); Maurice Arstein,
29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 961 (1970).
102. 331 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1964).
103. 387 F.2d 420 (8th Cir. 1968). See Comrent, Income Tax-Significant Motivation Test
for Determining Business Bad Debt Deductions, 2 TEXAS TECH. L. REv. 318 (1971).
104. 417 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1969).
105. 405 U.S. 93 (1972).
106. The remaining 12% of the stock in the corporation was owned by a son of the taxpayer
and by another son-in-law.
107. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 172. Section 172 provides generally that the excess of
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The Commissioner disallowed the claimed business bad debt deduction, and taxpayer instituted suit for a refund. After an instruction
by the district court that taxpayer need prove only "a significant business motivation" for executing the guaranty agreement in order to satisfy the "proximate relation" requirement, the jury handed down a
verdict for taxpayer and the Government appealed.'"8 When the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the district court judgment," 9 the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the circuits over the meaning
of "proximate relation" in Regulation section 1.166-5.110 The Court
reversed, holding that a taxpayer who seeks business bad debt treatment
must prove that his primary motive in consummating the loan transaction was to protect his separate business activity."'
Taxpayer had contended that Congress, in enacting the 1954 Code,
intended to extend the availability of ordinary deductions to losses from
debts not directly related to the taxpayer's trade or business. Under
section 23(k)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, the immediate
predecessor of section 166(d)(2), the definition of a business debt had
included only "a debt the worthlessness of which is incurred in the
taxpayer's trade or business.""' Taxpayer argued that the 1954 addition
of section 166(d)(2)(A)-including in the business debt definition debts
"created or acquired (as the case may be) in connection with a trade or
business of the taxpayer"-would have been meaningless unless motivated by a desire to place both directly and indirectly related debts on
an equal footing. ' 3 The majority opinion skirted the thrust of this
argument by declaring that the significant motivation test would tend
to obliterate or blunt"' the distinction drawn throughout the Code between the "particular tax benefits [given] to business losses, business
bad debts, and business expenses, and . . . [the] lesser benefits, or none
at all, [accorded] to non-business losses, non-business bad debts and
5
non-business expenses."''
Taxpayer also argued that the Supreme Court had already indiallowable deductions from ordinary income over the taxpayer's actual income in a given year may
be applied (carried "back" or "forward") against his taxable income in other years.
108. 67-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9754 (E.D. La. 1967).
109. 427 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1970).
110. 401 U.S. 972 (1971).
III. 405 U.S. 93 (1972); see Cohen, Supreme Court Restricts Business Bad Debt Treatment
of Stockholder-Corporate Loans, 36 J. TAXATION 194 (1972).
112. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 124, 56 Stat. 821, amending INT. REv. CODE OF 1939,
ch. 2, § 23(k), 53 Stat. 12.
113. Brief for Respondent at II, United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93 (1972).
114. 405 U.S. at 104.
115. Id. at 103.
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cated its approval of the significant motivation test in Whipple,", basing
his contention on the Court's ultimate disposition of the earlier case.
Taxpayer reasoned that, by remanding Whipple to the Tax Court for a
determination whether the loan had been made in taxpayer's business
of being a landlord, the Court had implicitly required proof of only a
single qualifying motivation, rather than proof that only qualifying motivations were present. The majority again avoided a direct rebuttal,
instead rejecting taxpayer's thesis on the ground that the significant
movitation standard would vitiate the distinction between a shareholdercreditor's investment and business interests upon which Whipple was
founded. In support of this conclusion, the majority opinion cited Judge
Lumbard's concurrence in Weddle, which had stated that the significant
motivation test would inevitably favor the taxpayer by discounting en7
tirely the effect of investment motivations."1
In reply to taxpayer's contention that Lundgren v. Commissioner"'
had demonstrated the "workability" of a significant motivation standard,"' the Court announced that the "dominant and primary" test
provides maximum certainty and is thus the only standard suitable for
resolving, by reference to objective criteria, the basic incongruity of the
dual motivation of a shareholder-creditor. "The trier then may compare
the risk against the potential reward and give proper emphasis to the
objective rather than the subjective."' 20 Taxpayer's alternative demand
that the Court not sacrifice fairness to the taxpayer in order to achieve
certainty 2' was dismissed with the observation that the strict requirement of a dominant motivation standard would better insure a fair
allocation of tax benefits consistent with the Code's rigid separation of
22
business from other activities.
The majority conceded that the use in the Regulations of the term
"proximate" was indeed unfortunate, but rejected out of hand taxpayer's suggestion that the word be given the meaning ascribed to it in
tort law. Considerations of unquestionable validity in the law of torts
were ruled quite inappropriate in federal income tax law.'2 Finally, the
Court refused to remand the case, on the ground that taxpayer had
offered no evidence that could satisfy the dominant motivation stan116.
117.
(Lumbard,
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Brief for Respondent at 12.
405 U.S. at 104; see Weddle v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 849, 852 (2d Cir. 1963)
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
376 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1967). See text accompanying notes 89-90 supra.
Brief for Respondent at 15.
405 U.S. at 104.
Brief for Respondent at 17.
405 U.S. at 105.
Id.
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dard; taxpayer's only evidence of a qualifying employment protection
motive was characterized by the majority as "self-serving statements"
that would not "withstand the light of analysis" on the facts of the
24
case.
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Marshall expressed reservations about the majority's purposive conclusion that "proximate" necessarily meant dominant and primary, reasoning that the ambiguity in the
statute and the regulations required a more penetrating inquiry into the

legislative history of section 166(d) and related loss provisions. This
inquiry led him to conclude that the primary motivation standard was
appropriate for two specific reasons. The first was the overall congressional approach to bad debt and loss deductions:
Congress wanted to permit deductions against ordinary income for bad-debt losses
only when the losses bore the same relation to the taxpayer's trade or business as
did other losses that the Code permits to be deducted against ordinary income.
Under § 165(c)(1) of the Code, 26 U.S.C. § 165(c)(1), the primary-motivation test
has always been used to determine whether these other losses are incurred in a trade
or business or in some other capacity, see e.g. Imbesi v. Commissioner, 361 F.2d
640 (CA3 1966), United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963).12

The second justification found by Justice Marshall in the legislative

history for the application of a primary motivation standard was the
express objective of the 1942 amendments-discouraging the use of
intrafamily loans to obtain unwarranted tax benefits, an especially rele-

vant consideration in Generes, since the Generes facts could easily be
characterized as the use of a corporation as a mere conduit for intrafam2
ilial transactions.

6

In a separate opinion, Justices White and Brennan approved the

dominant motivation test, but challenged the majority's outright reversal, asserting that the Court should have remanded the case for a hear-

2
ing on the sufficiency of the evidence under the approved standard.' 1
Implicit in this recommendation was a recognition that an outright
reversal without an elaboration of the objective criteria sufficient to
establish a dominant motivation would confuse future courts seeking to
124. Id. at 106.
125.

Id. at 111-12.

126. "If this taxpayer had simply lent his son-in-law $162,000 and then sought to deduct that
amount as a business bad debt when the latter's business collapsed, he plainly could not have
prevailed. This was just the sort of intra-family loan that Congress intended to bar from treatment
as a business bad debt. The fact that a corporation served as a conduit for the loan should make
no difference . . . .[lI]f instead of guaranteeing the construction bonds, the taxpayer had invested
SI 62.000 in the corporation to strengthen its economic position. . . any loss [from that investment]
would not be deductible against ordinary income. The fact that the intra-family contribution was
made in the form of a guarantee should be irrelevant for income tax purposes." Id. at Il1.
127. 405 U.S. at 112.
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apply the standard in varying factual situations.
Mr. Justice Douglas voiced a lone, but vigorous, dissent. He felt
that the ambiguity inherent in the statute and regulations should be
referred to the Treasury or Congress for clarification, rather than tested
by individual taxpayers proceeding in case-by-case litigation. In his
judgment, moreover, the Court's decision on the merits effectively upof taxpayers' property without
held affirmative executive deprivation
28
authority.'
express legislative
C.

The Impact of Generes

That four separate opinions were filed in Generes indicates the
difficulty that the Supreme Court encountered in applying the "proximate relation" test. It is not unlikely that this difficulty provided a
major impetus for the Court's decision to adopt the dominant motivation standard. Certainty in the law of taxation is indisputably a virtue;
the Generes standard will no doubt further this ideal in the administration of bad debt litigation. Guided by the primary motivation standard,
the fact finder need determine only the controlling motive of the taxpayer for extending a loan to his corporation. The Court's assumption
that this narrower inquiry will lead to more consistent adjudications of
bad debt claims than will independent evaluations of multiple motivations against a protean standard of "significance" seems well warranted.
Nevertheless, Generes has effectively promoted certainty of administration by sacrifing the equally desirable objective of certainty in business
and tax planning. Because the Generes decision leaves both the fact
finder and the shareholder-creditor with no clear statement of the criteria that reveal a taxpayer's primary motivation, even the rare businessman who thinks he has identified his dominant motive cannot be
sure that the fact finder will find it so. The Generes standard thus injects
substantial uncertainty into the planning of debt financing for a related
corporation.
The Generes majority was primarily concerned with an inherent
problem in a system of voluntary taxation-taxpayer attempts to cast
their transactions in forms giving rise to more favorable tax treatment
than the legislature deemed merited by the substance of what is done.
The Commissioner had warned that the significant motivation test
would intensify this problem because its more liberal approach "permits
the business considerations to control the tax result where the nonbusiness consideration is the predominant motivating factor.' ' 2 Generes
128.
129.

Id. at 113.
Brief for Petitioner at 16.
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thus represents a basic policy decision to value considerations of substance over those of form in the bad debt context. This central policy
orientation may explain the majority's casual attitude toward both the
specific terms of the statute and its legislative history. Although an
abandonment of strict statutory construction in furtherance of a clear
statutory policy may be laudable, it is arguable that the Generes Court's
emphasis on substance over form led it to contravene the explicit congressional policy of using tax incentives to encourage small business
investment and development. Congressional concern for small business
development, even at the expense of disparate treatment of individual
taxpayer investment activities, is most clearly embodied in section
1244110 and the Subchapter S provisions 13' of the Code. Adoption of
the significant motivation standard would have furthered this policy by
providing an incentive to entrepreneurial activities in the form of tax
relief for losses sustained by individuals on cash advances to small
business enterprises. The primary motivation standard, however, magnifies the threat of capital loss treatment inherent in loans to related
corporations, 32 and may thus be expected to inhibit significantly highrisk advances to close corporations. The planning uncertainty and increased probability of capital loss treatment occasioned by Generes,
moreover, may pose a direct threat to future small business formation
and development. Because close corporations often possess negligible
credit leverage, debt financing to survive business reverses or to capitalize upon risk opportunities is usually available only through direct loans
by interested shareholders or by third-party lenders, such as banks and
other lending institutions, who require personal guarantees from controlling shareholders. The budding entrepreneuer who is unwilling to
risk capital treatment of his entire economic loss in the event his business fails will thus be forced to abandon his corporate ambitions unless
he can structure his advances to avoid possible confrontations with
Generes and the dominant motivation standard. One method of avoid130. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1244 (added by the Business Tax Revision Act of 1958,
§ 202(b), 72 Stat. 1676). "This provision is designed to encourage the flow of new funds into small
business. The encouragement in this case takes the form of reducing the risk of a loss for these
new funds. The ordinary loss treatment which the bill accords shareholders in small corporations
in effect is already available to proprietors and partners. They report directly the earnings of
business ventures and thus ordinary losses realized by a proprietorship or partnership constitute
ordinary loss to the proprietor or partner. As a result, from the standpoint of risk taking, the bill
places shareholders in small corporations on a more nearly equal basis with these proprietors and
partners." H.R. REP. No. 2198, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1958).
131. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1371-79 (added by the Technical Amendments Act of
1958, § 64, 72 Stat. 1650).
132. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 385(b).
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ing the effects of Generes that may be available to the taxpayer is
designing the transaction to avoid section 166 entirely.
1. Third-PartyCreditors.-A much-litigated device by which taxpayers have sought to avoid section 166 has been the claim of a full
ordinary loss deduction under section 165(c)(2) for shareholder losses
on personal indemnity or guaranty agreements given to secure corporate
borrowings from unrelated third-party lenders. In Putnam v.
Commissioner, 33 the Supreme Court rejected such a claim by a taxpayer who had been required by the terms of a personal guaranty to
satisfy a corporate debt obligation. The Court's holding that taxpayer
was entitled only to a nonbusiness bad debt deduction was based upon
a precise analysis of the legal relationship between a guarantor and the
principal obligor, which the Court found to be that of creditor and
debtor. "The familiar rule is that, instanter upon the payment by the
guarantor of the debt, the debtor's obligation to the creditor becomes
an obligation to the guarantor, not a new debt, but, by subrogation, the
result of the shift of the original debt from the creditor to the guarantor
who steps into the creditor's shoes."' 13 4 By a parity of reasoning, a
shareholder-surety who manages to avoid subrogee status should not
automatically be viewed as the corporation's creditor; consequently, the
surety's loss does not technically arise from the worthlessness of a debt
in his hands.'35 This reasoning led several courts to uphold ordinary
deductions under section 165(c)(2) for losses sustained on transactions
so structured that the taxpayer had no right of subrogation against the
corporate obligor. 3' Similarly, guarantors occasionally were able to
avoid the effect of Putnam when they had forestalled automatic subrogation through such devices as partial payment of the principal obliga3
tion in settlement of the guaranty. 1
The emphasis in Putnam on the technical effect of subrogation in
the guaranty context left undetermined the proper tax treatment of a
shareholder who agrees to indemnify the third-party surety of his corporation's obligation. It is settled law that an indemnitor does not enjoy
the absolute right of subrogation that accrues to a guarantor automatically upon his payment of the obligation. Thus no debtor-creditor rela133. 352 U.S. 82 (1956).
134. Id. at 85.
135. See 3 J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME GIFr AND ESTATE TAXATION
1 35.06, at 3552-53 (rev. supp. 1972). See also Note, Nonbusiness Guaranty Loss: Ordinary or
Capital Deduction?, 10 WM. & MARY L. REv. 705, 709 (1969).
136. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Condit, 333 F.2d 585 (10th Cir. 1964); J.J. Shea, 36 T.C.
577 (1961), affd per curiam, 327 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1964); cf. Peter Stamos, 22 T.C. 885 (1954).
137. See, e.g., Santa Anita Consol., Inc., 50 T.C. 536, 555, 560-61 (1968).
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tionship is created between an obligor corporation and a shareholder
surety instanter upon the latter's payment under the indemnity agreement, and the shareholder's losses would seem to fall outside the restrictive provisions of section 166. Not all courts allowed such fine commonlaw distinctions to create different tax consequences for transactions
identical in economic substance. 318 In United States v. Hoffman,'39 for
example, the Ninth Circuit denied 165(c)(2) status to an indemnitor's
losses in a factual situation virtually indistinguishable from that in
Generes.4 0 The court held that evaluation of the claimed deduction
under section 166 was necessary "to protect the statutory scheme for a
common tax treatment of all losses suffered by a corporate stockholder
in providing his corporation with financing."'' Hoffman cited with approval an earlier decision of the Third Circuit, which had stated that
[ilt is not meaningful to emphasize unduly the common law principle of subrogation
in analyzing the substantial realities upon which federal taxation is based. . . .To
allow the tax result to turn on the presence or absence of this technical right of
subrogation under state law would be to undermine the Putnam doc42
trine-taxpayers could change capital losses to ordinary losses almost at will.'

In Generes, because taxpayer made no 165(c)(2) claim for an ordinary loss deduction, the Supreme Court did not rule on the significance
of subrogation rights in that context. Moreover, it would be inaccurate
to conclude that the Supreme Court necessarily rejected the materiality
of subrogation rights by its disposition of Generes merely because taxpayer there, like the taxpayer in Hoffman, stood in the position of
indemnitor to the surety bonding company; under the technical rules of
the common law, an indemnitor who is compelled to satisfy a surety's
liability is not entitled to subrogation.13 Nevertheless, the emphasis in
Generes on the economic substance of loan transactions is clearly inconsistent with a hypertechnical reading of the Code by which a two-step
capital contribution by a shareholder-surety would produce ordinary
income deductions for investment activity. Reliance upon the peculiari138. Cf., e.g., Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1933) (common-law distinctions are not
determinative for tax purposes).
139. 423 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1970).
140. Taxpayer in Hoffman was the president, director, and sole owner of a corporation
engaged in construction work. He received an annual salary for his services as an officer. In
addition to his responsibilities of receiving job bids, he obtained financing for the corporation's
performance bonds by agreeing to indemnify the bonding company. As a result of his corporation's
operational difficulties the bonding company was forced to make payments, for which taxpayer
made full indemnification.
141. 423 F.2d at 1218.
142. Stratmore v. United States, 420 F.2d 461, 465 (3d Cir. 1970).
143. Howell v. Commissioner, 69 F.2d 447. 451 (8th Cir. 1934).
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ties of the common law of subrogation will henceforth surely be misplaced.
2. Other Escapes from Section 166.-By eschewing direct or
guaranteed third-party loans the individual shareholder may still maximize his prospective tax benefits by supplying his corporate enterprise
with liquid assets in transactions that fall within section 165(c)(2). A
shareholder can, for example, easily convert cash into securities that
may be delivered to the use of his corporation for a stated periodic fee.
If the taxpayer takes care to avoid any arrangement for a right of return
by the corporation of a cash equivalent for the securities, the transaction
will retain the legal character of a bailment. If the corporation is later
forced to sell the securities because of business collapse, the shareholderbailor will be entitled to a full ordinary loss deduction under section
165(c)(2).'1
A few taxpayers will find it convenient to protect potential ordinary
loss deductions by placing risk capital in partnerships, corporations
issuing "small business stock" pursuant to section 1244, or Subchapter
S corporations. Both section 1244 and Subchapter S were designed to
encourage high-risk loans to developing corporations by providing ordinary deduction tax relief upon failure of the corporate enterprise. Each,
however, has rigid eligibility requirements and limitations on deductions. Section 1244 is perhaps better suited for investment in a new
corporation; because the limitations on total shareholder investment
apply only at the time a plan to offer section 1244 stock is adopted, the
taxpayer's potential deduction from ordinary income is preserved as
long as he holds the stock. Nevertheless, the ordinary deduction limit
of 25,000 dollars in any one year 4 5 offers inadequate protection in many
situations.
Causing an eligible debtor corporation to file an election under
Subchapter S is a method of salvaging a full loss deduction when expected corporate reverses threaten outstanding shareholder-creditor
advances. After the election becomes effective, current net operating
losses of the corporation are passed through to the shareholders. These
losses are immediately deductible from ordinary income, and there is
no requirement that deductions be postponed until disposition of the
stock or ultimate worthlessness of the investment. The amount of loss
available to the shareholder as a deduction is limited to the basis of his
stock in the corporation and to any debt the corporation owes him.
Discharge of guaranty obligations incurred by a stockholder, however,
144.
145.

Stahl v. United States, 441 F.2d 999 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
The limitation is $50,000 for married shareholders filing a joint return.
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will occasion indebtedness on the part of the corporation, thereby increasing pro tanto the amount of deductible loss. The limits to which a
net operating loss can be charged off cannot be increased by an increase
of investment or by corporate debt to the stockholder in a year subsequent to the taxable year in which the net operating loss occurs.
3. Business Bad Debts After Generes.-Although Generes has
clearly narrowed the concept of the business bad debt, the decision does
not appear to have altered substantially the factors one must consider
when preparing a claim for a full ordinary deduction. Unquestionably,
the burden of proof necessary to sustain a business bad debt claim has
been markedly increased. Indeed, it may now be unrealistic for a taxpayer to expect to overcome a challenge by the Commissioner to business debt status. Nevertheless, the shareholder-creditor who is pressed
into conference or litigation should resort to established judicial doctrines in order to support his claim. For example, business bad debt
deductions remain available to the true promoter, and to the dealer in
enterprises,"' if the underlying loan is proximately related to such activity. 17 An individual who organizes one or many corporations does not
necessarily qualify as a promoter. If he neither earns fees for promotions nor profits on quick sales, but seeks only investment gains from
long-term operations and ultimate disposition, he will be denied promoter status.4 8 One who is in the business of lending money for profit
may obtain the tax benefits accruing to business bad debts; nevertheless,
loans to corporations in which the taxpayer has a substantial investment
or family interest will rarely qualify.' Loans made to preserve one's
employment may qualify for business bad debt treatment, 5 ' but this
result does not follow from the mere showing of an employment relationship.' 5' The controlling shareholder who relies on the employment
protection doctrine has small chance of success, particularly when his
salary is modest in comparison with his investment interests, 52 or when
he could readily obtain equivalent employment elsewhere. 5 3 Loans to
146. A dealer in enterprises is a person in the business of organizing and financing corpora-

tions and selling them at a profit. Giblin v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 692, 695-96 (5th Cir. 1955);
see Ralph Biernbaum, 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1188, 1196 (1963); text accompanying notes 44-52
supra.
147. United States v. Clark, 358 F.2d 892 (Ist Cir. 1966).
148. Townshend v. United States, 384 F.2d 1008 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Syer v. United States, 380
F.2d 1009 (4th Cir. 1967); United States v. Byck, 325 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1963).
149. Gross v. Commissioner, 401 F.2d 600 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v. Henderson. 375
F.2d 36, 41 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 844 (1967).
150. Trent v. Commissioner, 291 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1961).
151. United States v. Worrell, 398 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1968).
152. Millsap v. Commissioner, 387 F.2d 420, 422 (8th Cir. 1968).
153. Niblock v. Commissioner, 417 F.2d 1185, 1187 (7th Cir. 1969).
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a related corporation made to assure a source of supply or demand for
one's individual business may result in business bad debts. 5' If there is
no shortage of supply, however, an ordinary deduction may be denied
on the assumption that the real motivation of the loan was the lender's
investment interests.'5 5 Finally, even a pure equity investment may be
so proximately related to the shareholder's separate business that the
loss may qualify as an ordinary business deduction.'
The types of evidence isolated as most significant in determining a
shareholder-creditor's motivation have been: the taxpayer's testimony;
the proportional relationship of the taxpayer's salary to the value of his
investment; the possibility of the corporation's failure without the lending assistance procured by the taxpayer; and the extent of authority the
taxpayer could exercise over the hiring and firing of corporate employees.' 7 These criteria appear to remain valid. Other factors, such as the
frequency of taxpayer's lending activity and the demands of the corporation's creditors, that bear upon the shareholder's motivation may also
be considered by the trier of fact. Additional indicia of business motivation will presumably be enumerated on a case-by-case basis.
The Generes holding attempts to remove from individual cases
arising under section 166-the provisions of which are perhaps as
vaguely drawn and as susceptible to varying interpretation as any in the
Code-the necessity of balancing the competing taxpayer and revenue
interests by adopting a uniform standard that will serve both interests
in all bad debt litigation. The inquiry required by Generes is designed
not only to encourage the production of evidence that will "bear the
light of analysis" and thus relieve litigants of inaccurate and inconsistent
decisions, but also to restrict the availability of preferential tax treatment, thereby ensuring both a more equitable allocation of the tax
burden and an increase in tax revenues. The resulting strong presumption in favor of the Commissioner will theoretically be acceptable to the
individual taxpayer when he realizes that a demanding, objective standard for allocating tax benefits will foster certainty in tax administration."'
154. J.T. Dorminey, 26 T.C. 940, 945 (1956).
155. Spillers v. Commissioner, 407 F.2d 530, 534-35 (5th Cir. 1969).
156. See Steadman v. Commissioner, 424 F.2d I, 5-6 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 869
(1970).
157. Note, Individual's Deduction for Business Bad Debts Under the Internal Revenue
Code, 12 B.C. IND. & CoMt. L. REV. 478, 488 (1971).
158. Controversy over the dominant motivation standard as a useful device for revealing
taxpayer intent had earlier surfaced in United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297 (1969), in which
the Court sought to determine the quantum of tax avoidance purpose necessary to incur liability
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The question remains, however, whether the substantial contribution of Generes to sound tax administration is sufficient to negate the
decision's adverse practical impact upon taxpayers in a congressionally
favored sector of the economy. The Court's "primary motivation" test
of proximate relationship will invariably discriminate against the
shareholder-creditor who had several motives for his advance, even
when he would not have made the loan but for his independent business
interests. As a result, all but the most obvious business bad debt claims
will be placed in jeopardy. Absent a reasonable availability of full deductions from ordinary income to partially offset the risk of loss, small
businessmen will hesitate to supply, through loans or guaranties, the
financing necessary to stabilize a floundering corporation. Third-party
lending institutions, understandably reluctant to assume the great risk
of small business financing without the assurance of a personal guaranty
executed by a shareholder or employee of substantial personal net
worth, offer no residual relief. Thus, the increased probability of capital
loss treatment following Generes may largely vitiate investment incentive.
V.

CONCLUSION

The federal income tax system has fostered a constant struggle
between the taxpayer, who tries to alleviate what he feels to be a weighty
tax burden by structuring transactional forms to meet the letter of the
Code, and the Commissioner, who seeks to cut through these forms to
expose the underlying economic reality by a purposive reading of the
levying enactments. In justification of his position, the taxpayer urges
that he is legally right, and perhaps morally obligated, to save every tax
dollar that the letter of the law allows, while the Commissioner insists
that the always escalating revenue needs of responsible government
require each taxpayer to contribute his fair share. It is axiomatic that
for the accumulated earnings tax imposed by section 531. The Court held that, unless a corporate
taxpayer can establish that shareholder tax avoidance was not one of the purposes for accumulation, the fact that earnings and profits are permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs
of the business shall be determinative of surtax liability. Taxpayer's contention that the tax avoidance purpose need be dominant, compelling, and controlling was rejected as contrary to the true
legislative purpose behind the accumulated earnings tax, because the suggested standard would
allow the taxpayer to escape the surtax by a purposive marshalling of subjective evidence showing
at least one qualifying business motive equal to that of tax avoidance. In refusing to require a
difficult and dubious separate evaluation and comparison of subjectively evidenced multiple corporate motives, the Court articulated a preference for the more objective inquiry into the reasonableness of the retention of earnings and profits for purported business needs. Thus, these seemingly
inconsistent decisions are easily reconciled as products of the same judicial desire to accomodate
the conflicting interests of the government and the taxpayer.
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tax liability should reflect the substance of a taxpayer's economic status.
Similarly, a self-assessment system requires that taxpayers retain confidence that each bears only his fair share of the tax burden.
The conflict between these essentially dissimilar objectives comes
to sharpest focus in the context of vaguely drawn legislation. In resolving this conflict, the judiciary must try to accommodate both interests
as it applies the statutory language to particular cases. A judicial effort
to grant relief in an individual case may open the door to flagrant abuse,
and an attempt to rectify abuse may result in an unjustified reversal of
the taxpayer's expectations.
The Generes case represents an attempt by the Court to fashion a
clear standard that will lead to decisions based upon considerations of
economic substance underlying the form of particular transactions. In
one sense, the Court unquestionably has succeeded; the stringent requirements of the primary motivation test appear to leave little likelihood that a transaction consummated in anticipation of investment
rewards will escape capital loss treatment. The almost insuperable difficulty of proving dominant business motivation, however, seems likely
to make the result in many cases depend more upon forensic considerations than upon economic substance. To the extent that the economic
realities of taxpayer activity are thus discounted, the Generes Court is
guilty of judicial overkill.
BLAND W.

CANNON, JR.

